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INTRODUCTION
In-the post-Cold War period, the United Nations Security Council
has emerged from a side show of international politics to center stage. It
has acted to repel aggression, to promote humanitarian efforts, and to
enforce democracy. This flowering of activity holds the potential for
achieving concerted international action to remedy situations involving
great human misery.
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., Harvard Law School (1966); M.A.,
Harvard University (1966); A.B., Harvard College (1962).
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The Security Council, however, has faltered in the manner in which
it has approached this activity. The concept of the United Nations
Charter is that action to protect the peace should be multilateral. Only
thereby can assurance be provided that collective force will be used only
in pursuit of commonly held objectives of the international community.
The multilateral character of collective force used under United
Nations auspices is, according to Chapter VII of the Charter, to involve
decision making by the Security Council on the need to initiate force,
operational control by the Security Council over military units in the
field, and power in the Security Council to determine when to cease
hostilities. The Security Council has, however, failed to follow this
approach. Instead, the Council has resorted to a formula for military
action that eschews multilateralism. This formula involves authorizing or
calling upon member states generally to act with the Security Council's
blessing but without its control. This approach represents the antithesis
of the mechanism provided by the Charter.
By turning the use of force over to member states, the Security
Council has relinquished its Charter defined role. To analogize to gov-
ernment policy in a domestic context, what the Security Council has
done is to follow the trend toward privatization. Instead of carrying out
military actions itself, the Council hires the work out to individual
states, typically to states that have expressed an interest in doing so and
which, as a consequence, may have private aims to pursue.
The Security Council's approach has its supporters, indeed a majori-
ty of the membership of the Security Council in the years since 1990.
The argument in favor of "privatization" is that it provides a practical
method of achieving international action where true collective force is
politically or financially impossible. The choice, argue proponents, is
not between Security Council control and no Security Council control,
but between action or no action. This Article explores the Security
Council's resort to the privatization of armed force, and its implications
for the future of collective force under United Nations auspices.
I. THE PRACTICE OF AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE
The Security Council has employed the technique of authorizing
member states to use military force to deal with the conflict situations
that have drawn the Council's attention in the post-Cold War period.
The first instance was in 1990 in a resolution aimed against Iraq follow-
ing its invasion of Kuwait. The Council's resolution read:
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The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661
(1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) 669
(1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990) and 677 (1990) [a series of resolu-
tions finding Iraq at fault and imposing economic and diplomatic
sanctions],
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq
refuses to comply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660
(1990) and subsequent resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the
Council,
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of
the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of interna-
tional peace and security,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while main-
taining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a
pause of good will, to do so;
2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the Government
of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before Jan. 15, 1991, fully imple-
ments, as set forth in paragraph I above, the foregoing resolutions,
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security
Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant Resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for the
actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution;
and
4. Requests the states concerned to keep the Council regularly
informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to para-
graphs 2 and 3 of this resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.'
The United States, which drafted the resolution, had let it be known in
advance that it would act on the authorization if it were granted.2
1. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990) (underlining omitted) [hereinafter Iraq Resolution].
The resolution was adopted by 12 votes (Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ivory
Coast, Malaysia, Romania, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Zaire) to two (Cuba, Yemen), with one
abstention (China). Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at
64-65, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990) [hereinafter SCOR, 2963d mtg.].
2. See, e.g., Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992)
(stating,
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In 1992, the Security Council, finding a threat to the peace in
Bosnia, and again stating that it was acting under Chapter VII, "call[ed]
upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrange-
ments all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the
United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian
organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and
wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina."3 The reso-
lution asked states that might act under it to "report to the Secretary-
General on measures they are taking."4 No states had volunteered to act
at the time the resolution was adopted.
Later in 1992, the Security Council found a threat to the peace in a
situation of internal disorder and severe privation in Somalia. In its
resolution, the Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
authorize[d] the Secretary General and Member States cooperating
to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above [an offer
by the United States to establish a military force] to use all neces-
sary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.5
In 1993, the Security Council adopted another resolution on Bosnia
that authorized member states to act, although the term "authorize" did
not appear. It
[d]ecide[d] that ... Member States, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the
I received a visit from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, the Acting Secretary of State of
the United States of America, who informed me that if the Security Council were
to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery
of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to
take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number
of other Member States would also participate.).
3. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/REs/770 (1992)
[hereinafter Bosnia Resolution]. The resolution was adopted by 12 votes (Austria, Belgium,
Cape Verde, Ecuador, France, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Russia, U.K., U.S.A., Venezuela) to
zero, with three abstentions (China, India, Zimbabwe). Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 26, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3106 (1992) [hereinafter SCOR,
3106th mtg.].
4. Bosnia Resolution, supra note 3, at 2.
5. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992)
[hereinafter Somalia Resolution]. The resolution was adopted by 15 votes (Austria, Belgium,
Cape Verde, China, Ecuador, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Russia, U.K., U.S.A.,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe) to zero. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th
mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3145 (1992) [hereinafter SCOR, 3145th mtg.].
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authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination
with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary mea-
sures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR
6
As before, no states had offered to act.
In 1994, the Security Council found a threat to the peace in Rwan-
da, where internal disorder was accompanied by the widespread killing
of civilians. The Security Council authorized an operation to protect
refugees and to secure delivery of aid supplies: The Council:
2. [w]elcome[d] also the offer by Member States (S/1994/34)
to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the
objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the establish-
ment of a temporary operation under national command and control
aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and
protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in
Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the
offer will be borne by the Member States concerned
3. [a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, authorize[d] the Member States cooperating with the
Secretary-General to conduct the operations referred to in para-
graph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitari-
an objectives set out in sub-paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of resolution
925 (1994)..
The offer mentioned in'paragraph 2 was from France.8 The referenced
resolution 925 was an earlier Council resolution that established a mili-
tary force to protect civilians called the United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Resolution 925, in its sub-paragraphs 4(a)
6. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993)
[hereinafter Bosnia Safe Areas Resolution]. The resolution was adopted by 13 votes (Brazil,
Cape Verde, China, Djibouti, France, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Russia, Spain,
U.K., U.S.A.) to zero, with 2 abstentions (Pakistan, Venezuela). Provisional Verbatim Record,
48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3228 (1993).
7. S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994)
[hereinafter Rwanda Resolution]. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes (Argentina, Czech
Republic, Djibouti, France, Oman, Russia, Rwanda, Spain, U.K., U.S.A.) to zero, with 5
abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan). Provisional Verbatim Record,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3392 (1994) [hereinafter SCOR,
3392d mtg.].
8. See Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994) (describ-
ing France's offer to head a multinational force in Rwanda "subject to Security Council
authorization"). See also SCOR, 3392d mtg., supra note 7, at 5 (Mr. Mdrimde, France,
explaining "the French initiative" that led to the Rwanda resolution).
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and 4(b), stated the objectives as being to "(a) [c]ontribute to the securi-
ty and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in
Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where
feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and (b) [p]rovide security and
support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief
operations." 9
Also in 1994, the Security Council found a threat to the peace in
Haiti after a refusal to surrender power by a military group that had
removed Haiti's elected president from office. The Council adopted a
resolution which stated that it was "acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter" which
authorize[d] Member States to form a multinational force under
unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the mili-
tary leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement,
the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti,
and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that
will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agree-
ment .... 10
Haiti's military rulers had agreed to relinquish power under the Gover-
nors Island Agreement." The United States had indicated an intent to
act with Security Council authorization. 2
Thus, the Security Council, having once used the authorization
technique in the Iraq resolution, has resorted to it in subsequent situa-
tions where it deemed appropriate the use of military force. Despite its
now frequent use of the technique, the Security Council has not speci-
fied, other than by its general references to Chapter VII, how the tech-
nique conforms to its powers. Since the Council possesses powers as
9. S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3338th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/925
(1994). UNAMIR was instructed to use force only in self-defense "against persons or groups
who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian person-
nel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief." Id.
10. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994) [hereinafter Haiti Resolution]. The resolution was adopted by 12 votes (Argentina,
Czech Republic, Djibouti, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Spain,
U.K., U.S.A.) to zero, with 2 abstentions (Brazil and China). Provisional Verbatim Record,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3413 (1994) [hereinafter SCOR,
3413th mtg.].
11. See SCOR, 3413th mtg., supra note 10, at 12 (Governors Island Agreement, dated
July 3, 1993, discussed by U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright and indicating that military
rulers of Haiti had failed, despite the agreement, to relinquish power).
12. See SCOR, 3413th mtg., supra note 10, at 13 (Mrs. Albright, United States, stating,
"the United States is prepared to organize and lead such a force").
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granted by the U.N. Charter, it is there that one must look to assess the
legality of the authorization technique.
II. SECURITY COUNCIL'S POWERS IN PEACE MAINTENANCE
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter confers the power of peace mainte-
nance on the Security Council: "In order to ensure prompt and effective
action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Coun-
cil primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibili-
ty the Security Council acts on their behalf."' 3 One analyst finds the
authorization technique to be in violation of this provision:
By virtue of Article 24, the members of the United Nations have
conferred the responsibility for maintenance of the peace on the
Security Council and not on any other entity that the Council may
imagine. All the procedural rules governing the exercise of this
responsibility would be circumvented if there were such a power of
delegation.'
4
The procedural rules to which the author refers are found in Chapter
VII, which spells out the role of the Security Council in peace mainte-
nance. There, Article 39 gives the Council the power and the obligation
to act to maintain the peace: "The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security."'
15
If the Council finds that one of the events mentioned in Article 39
has occurred, Article 41 gives the Council the option of instituting
measures not involving military force:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its deci-
sions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial inter-
ruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraph-
ic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.
16
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
14. Michael Bothe, Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de s&iuritf, in PEACE-KEEPING
AND PEACE-BUILDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 67, 73
(Rend-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993) [hereinafter PEACE-KEEPING] (translation by the author).
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
16. Id. art. 41.
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Article 42 gives the Council a second option, namely, military force:
Should the Security Council decide that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.'
7
Thus, the Security Council is to determine that there is a problem (Arti-
cle 39). It may then make recommendations to the parties (Article 39) or
proceed to enforcement measures. The latter may involve economic or
diplomatic measures (Article 41) or military action (Article 42). No
mention is made in Chapter VII of an alternative route to military action
undertaken by individual member states with the Security Council's
authorization.
The Security Council was to have at its disposal troops designated
by member states to be on the ready to maintain international peace,
pursuant to agreements between the Council and individual member
states.' 8 The Council was to have a Military Staff Committee, composed
of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members, to coordinate the
activities of these troops and to direct military operations.' 9
No troops, however, have been designated by member states,20 and
the Military Staff Committee has existed in name only. After Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that
the Military Staff Committee be activated to manage any possible action
of the Council.2' Indeed, after the Security Council called for a trade
embargo against Iraq, the United States conferred with the other perma-
nent members of the Council to explore whether the Military Staff
17. Id. art. 42.
18. Id. art. 43. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of
the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 150, 298 (July 20) [hereinafter Certain Expenses] (Bustamante, J.,
dissenting) (stating that if the Council is unable to get troops from member states, it may
nonetheless carry out an enforcement action by assembling the troops in whatever way it
can).
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 47.
20. See Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992) (urging
states to conclude such agreements with the Security Council).
21. Frank J. Prial, Crisis Breathes Life into a Moribund U.N. Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1990, at A20. The Committee met to discuss the Council's economic sanctions. Paul Lewis,
Security Council's Military Panel Reviews Naval Efforts to Enforce Trade Embargo, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at All. See Paul Lewis, Soviet Announces Shift on U.N. Staff De-
manded by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at Al (proposal by Gorbachev to revive Military
Staff Committee).
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Committee might coordinate blockade activities to enforce the embar-
go.22 Nothing, however, came of these proposals.
23
The Iraq resolution created no role for the Military Staff Commit-
tee.24 Iraq cited the absence of a role for the Military Staff Committee to
argue the illegality of the authorization technique as it was being applied
against it. Iraq said that "only collective action under the command and
control of the Security Council, in co-ordination with the Military Staff
Committee, can lead to the use of force against any country, and no
individual Member State may be authorized to lynch a particular country
for any reason. 25
A former United Nations under secretary-general lent credence to
the Iraqi position when he criticized the Iraq resolution for omitting a
role for the Military Staff Committee: "Articles 46 and 47 clearly imply
that enforcement measures under chapter VII would be under the control
of the Council and its Military Staff Committee .... but no such control
was provided for [in the Iraq resolution]. 2 6
Prior to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the
1990s, the only instance of a resolution leading to the use of force was
in connection with the situation in Korea in 1950. The legal basis for
the Council's action there was not clear. Article 42 refers to the Council
"deciding" to take measures. In its resolution on Korea, however, the
Council instead "recommended" that states take action. Specifically, the
Council "recommend[ed] that the Members of the United Nations fur-
nish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in
the area., 27 Some commentators considered the Council's use of the
word "recommend" instead of "decide" as indicating that the Council
purported to act under Article 39 alone, bypassing Article 42.28 On this
22. Margaret Tutwiler, State Department Regular Briefing, Aug. 14, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News library, Script File.
23. See S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. -Doc.
S/RES/665 (1990).
24. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess." 107, 157 (1990) (Secretary of State James Baker stating that
"if this were done you begin getting into questions of whether or not there should be a U.N.
command of forces, whether or not the Military Staff Committee should give directions to the
multinational force, and questions of that kind, which we do not think, under these circum-
stances, are things that we ought to invite").
25. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 21 (Mr. AI-Anbari, Iraq).
.26. Brian Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 7, 1991, at 34.
27. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.I
(1950).
28. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 315 (1969).
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analysis, the Council construed "recommendations" in Article 39 as
referring not only to recommendations to the parties to a dispute, but
also to the United Nations membership to participate in military action.
It was on this basis that Hans Kelsen criticized the Security Coun-
cil's Korea resolution as improper. Kelsen did not find in Article 39 a
power to recommend what amounts to enforcement action:
[I]t is doubtful whether a recommendation of an enforcement
action corresponds to the intention of those who framed the Charter
.... If the Security Council, after having determined under Article
39 the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace, is of the
opinion that enforcement measures are necessary to maintain or
restore international peace, the Council must take these measures
itself by acting under Article 41 or 42 ....
The propriety of Kelsen's reading of the Charter is seen if Article
39 is read in pari materiae with Article 36, which also mentions recom-
mendations. Article 36 is found in Chapter VI, which deals with inter-
state disputes not involving a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
aggression. In dealing with such lesser disputes, the Council may,
according to Article 36, "recommend appropriate procedures or methods
of adjustment" to the parties involved. The "recommendation" men-
tioned in Article 39 is an analogue for the situation in which there is a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or aggression. The Council
devises a "recommendation" to the parties for a peaceful settlement of
their conflict.3°
The committee that drafted Article 39 explained that by "recommen-
dations" it intended "to show that the action of the Council so far as it
relates to the peaceful settlement of a dispute or to situations giving rise
to a threat of war, a breach of the peace, or aggression, should be
considered as governed by the provisions contained in Section A.",31
"Section A" became Chapter VI in the final text of the Charter. Chapter
VI, as indicated, provides procedures for the Security Council to use in
handling disputes that do not amount to a threat to the peace, breach of
29. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 932 (1950). See also Erik Suy,
Peace-Keeping Operations, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 379, 381
(Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1988) ("The Organization endeavoured in this case [Korea] to preserve
its military enforcement capability by means which were not strictly in accordance with the
explicit provisions for that purpose in the Charter. The highly sensitive issues raised by this
venture caused this type of experiment not to be repeated, however.").
30. See Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision-
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 521 (1991) (stating that Article 39
recommendations involve recommendations under chapter VI for peaceful resolution).
31. Doc. 943, 111/5, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 51 (1945).
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the peace, or aggression. Whether or not the Council makes recommen-
dations to the parties when their situation amounts to a threat to the
peace or breach of the peace or aggression, Chapter VI should apply. As
used in Chapter VI, "recommendations" clearly means suggestions ad-
dressed to the parties, and this history of the text indicates that it has the
same meaning in Chapter VII.
III. REASONS WHY THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE
HAS BEEN EMPLOYED
The authorization approach is the product of a history of unwilling-
ness or the inability of the members of the United Nations to establish
the kind of security apparatus contemplated by the U.N. Charter. The
primary justification for the authorization technique from a policy
standpoint is that it is a second-best, but still viable method of proceed-
ing in a crisis situation, given that the Security Council has no function-
ing Military Staff Committee, and given that some states are unwilling
to turn troops over to a United Nations command. The authorization ap-
proach is better than no action at all.
From a legal standpoint, the departure from the Charter, involved in
the authorization technique, can be rationalized on the grounds that the
Charter has been used by U.N. organs as a flexible document, rather
than one that must be confined strictly to its wording. The General
Assembly, for example, devised a procedure for organizing military
operations that was arguably in violation of the Charter, in response to
the difficulty of gaining Security Council action because of vetoes cast
by a permanent member.32 When some Security Council permanent
members in voting on resolutions evidenced a desire to abstain, the
Council deemed such resolutions to be adopted, even though the lan-
guage of the Charter requires permanent members to cast an affirmative
vote.33 Even more significantly, the Council developed a practice of
inserting military forces in what came to be called a peacekeeping
capacity, with the consent of the host state, despite the fact that the
Charter gives it no power to do so.34
32. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(v), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
33. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission
of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 3, 28 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter Competence of
General Assembly] (Azevedo, J., dissenting). See also John Quigley, The United States and
the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder? 25 CORNELL J. INT'L
L. 1, 28-32 (1992).
34. See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, 4 UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-79
(1981).
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Opinions of some judges of the International Court of Justice have
supported the prerogative of the principal U.N. organs to apply the
Charter expansively. Judge Azevedo has written: "[T]he interpretation of
the San Francisco instruments will always have to present a teleological
character if they are to meet the requirements of world peace .... The
Charter is a means and not an end."35 Judge Alvarez has said: "[A]n
institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of
the elements which have given birth to it, and it must develop, not in
accordance with the views of those who created it, but in accordance
with the requirements of international life."36 Elsewhere Judge Alvarez
has written: "[I]t is possible, by way of interpretation, to attribute to an
institution rights which it does not possess according to the provisions
by which it was created, proyided that these rights are in harmony with
the nature and objects of the said institution."37 While most judges of
the Court have not made such strong statements about flexibility in
construing the Charter, the Court has not been overly demanding.
If one looks to Security Council action as precedent in assessing the
authorization technique, one finds that the Council has not kept to the
strict letter of the Charter - the Korea resolution being the prime
example.38 Viewed in light of this history of playing fast and loose with
the Charter, the departure from Charter language involved in the authori-
zation technique is less shocking.
The Council is a political, not a judicial body. In most war-and-
peace situations, a member state seeking the adoption of a resolution
may have to compromise to gain acceptance by the permanent members
and by a sufficient number of non-permanent members, and this necessi-
ty may lead to departures from the Charter-mandated procedures. It may
be unrealistic to expect the Council to abide by the Charter.
Moreover, it can be argued that legitimacy is less significant than
success, and that if the two are at odds, the latter is to be preferred. The
United Nations is criticized for failing to act in situations that call for
peace enforcement. If the major powers are unwilling to have the Coun-
cil take Article 42 action, and if the only route to action is via the
authorization technique, then, according to this view, the United Nations
35. Competence of General Assembly, supra note 33, at 23 (Azevedo, J., dissenting).
36. Advisory Opinion, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 68 (May 28) [hereinafter Conditions of Admission] (Alvarez, J.,
individual opinion).
37. Competence of General Assembly, supra note 33, at 18 (Alvarez, J., dissenting).
38. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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should use the authorization technique; and if the action succeeds, the
criticism over process should be lost in the praise of a successful out-
come.
39
Despite these considerations in its favor, the authorization technique
comes at considerable cost to the integrity of the process of peace
maintenance. It is the legal and practical hazards of the technique that
must now be addressed.
IV. SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATION TO INITIATE-
MILITARY ACTION
One aspect of the procedures established by Chapter VII is that the
Security Council, rather than individual member states, decides when to
use military force.' This concept, indeed, was the innovation in the
U.N. Charter over the Covenant of the League of Nations. In cases of
aggression, the League's Covenant gave the League's Council only a
power to recommend measures to member states. If the Council recom-
mended a measure and a state acted on the recommendation, the deci-
sion was that of the state, not of the Council.4'
The U.N. Charter deprived states of the power to determine unilater-
ally when to use force by transferring that power to the Security Coun-
cil.42 The authorization technique arguably turns the Charter system on
its head, in effect reverting to the League of Nations approach.43
In the early history of the United Nations, the only Security Council
action of an enforcement type, involving the dispatch of military units,
was in Korea in 1950. There the Council delegated considerable author-
ity to one state - the United States - but it decided itself that military
39. See Richard Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 611, 613 n.4 (1994) (author presenting, without endorsing, this view). See
also David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 554 n.8 (1993) (stating that Council members appear more concerned
about whether the Council can act than about whether it acts in conformity with the Charter);
id. at 557-58 (raising the question whether the Security Council can withstand "occasional
perceptions of illegitimacy" if it is generally effective in its work).
40. Louis Cavare, Les sanctions dans le Pacte de la S.D.N. et dans la Charte des N.U.,
54 REVUE GtNIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 647, 660 (1950).
41. Id. at 650. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, 1 2; GOODRICH ET AL.,
supra note 28, at 315.
42. Cavare, supra note 40, at 648. See GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 28, at 315.
43. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 58 (Mr. Malmierca Peoli, Cuba, stating that the
lraq resolution "violates the Charter of the United Nations by authorizing some states to use
military force in total disregard of the procedures established by the Charter").
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action should be taken immediately. Furthermore, the Council itself
created a command structure to function under the U.N. flag.
4
Because of the Security Council's Charter-mandated role in deciding
when force should be initiated, not all of the states that voted for the
Iraq resolution, with its "authorization" language, were sure that the
resolution constituted a final authorization to states. Malaysia, which as
a Council member voted in favor of the Iraq resolution, said at the time
of the vote that an additional resolution would be needed: "Any pro-
posed use of force must be brought before the Council for its prior
approval, in accordance with the specific provisions of Chapter VII of
the Charter. We regret that this point is not clearly reflected in this
resolution, a precedent that may not bode well for the future. 45 Malay-
sia based its interpretation on the view that under Chapter VII it is the
Security Council alone that has the authority to initiate military force.
There is considerable force in Malaysia's position that the Council
ignored its responsibility by delegating so much power to member
states. One analyst has written in this regard, that "coercive actions con-
templated by Article 42 must be actions led under the effective direction
of the Security Council and not actions undertaken by given states mem-
bers on their own on the basis of their own decision, enjoying a kind of
global blessing from the Security Council."
The formulation that the Security Council has used in issuing autho-
rizations makes it clear that the states are left to decide whether to take
military action. Starting with the Iraq resolution, the Council has not
mentioned military force as the action it was authorizing, but speaks
rather of "all necessary means" or words to that effect.47 This formula-
tion leaves it to the member states to decide whether military force, or
some measures short of it, might bring about the desired result.48 Thus,
the decision to use military force is being left to the member states; if
they decide to use it, they would be doing so with the Security Coun-
cil's approval.
44. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev.I (1950).
45. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 76 (statement of Mr. AI-Anbari, Iraq).
46. Bothe, supra note 14, at 74 (translation by author).
47. The only exception is the Bosnia Safe Areas Resolution, supra note 6, which men-
tions air power.
48. Council members understood "all necessary means" to include military action.
SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 62 (Mr. Qian Qichen, China, stating that "all necessary
means ... in essence, permits the use of military action"); id. at 71 (Mr. Clark, Canada,
stating that the "means" in the Iraq resolution "include the use of force"); id. at 81-82 (Mr.
Hurd, U.K., referring to the resolution as "the military option"); id. at 103 (Mr. Baker,
U.S.A., stating that the "[Iraq] resolution is very clear. The words authorize the use of
force"). See also BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 334 (1991) (reporting that the United
States had wanted an explicit reference to military force, but that the U.S.S.R. objected, and
the United States substituted "all necessary means").
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It is doubtful, however, that the Security Council may, consistent
with the Charter, leave a decision to take military action to the discre-
tion of whichever member states are so inclined. Under Article 42, it
will be recalled, the Security Council "may take such action ... as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.' '49
This language suggests that it is the Council that takes the action, with
the Council bearing responsibility for the decision to initiate military
action. The forces themselves, to be sure, are the forces of member
states. Yet, under Article 42, it is the Council, not individual member
states, that makes the decision to act.
V. UNCERTAINTY THAT ANY ACTION WILL ENSUE
One hazard of the authorization technique is that states may not act
on it. If the Security Council decides that military action is required and
"authorizes" member states to undertake it, the member states may
determine that, for whatever reason, they will not act. Thus, even though
the Council would have determined force to be necessary, force would
not be undertaken.
This potential scenario flies in the face of the fact that the Security
Council is supposed to act, under Chapter VII, if it finds a threat to the
peace. Article 39 obliges the Council to counter a threat to the peace,
stating that once the Council decides that the peace is jeopardized, it
"shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken .... ,50 However, with the authorization technique, there is no
assurance that any action will follow. In most of the instances of use of
the authorization technique, at least one state was prepared in advance to
act. Nonetheless, action still depended on the will of that state (or
states), and there was no assurance that this state (or states) might not
change its mind.
The Haiti episode revealed the possibility that the states contemplat-
ing intervention under the authorization may waver in their determina-
tion. For the United States, the primary state willing to intervene in
Haiti, domestic political factors intruded, leaving in doubt for a time
whether the United States would act. One reason for United States
willingness to intervene in Haiti was the large numbers of Haitians
sailing to the United States in small boats seeking asylum. After the
Haiti resolution was adopted, that flow of refugees subsided, and in their
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 42, 1.
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, 1.
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place came large numbers of refugees from Cuba. This change in the
refugee situation diminished domestic- political support for intervention.5'
Another factor which lessened the United States' determination was
that the Rwanda crisis peaked at almost exactly the same time, and the
uncertainty of success there gave the United States pause about attempt-
ing to use military force in Haiti. 52 In the final analysis the United States
acted, but the uncertainty that reigned in the weeks following the Securi-
ty Council's adoption of the resolution pointed out quite clearly the
possibility that the authorization technique might lead nowhere.
VI. SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATION TO
CONTROL MILITARY ACTION
Another problematic aspect of the authorization technique is that the
Security Council does not control military action, once underway.53 Ac-
cording to the Charter, the Council must not only make the decision to
act but must define military objectives and decide when to terminate
hostilities. 54 As one author commented in criticizing the authorization
technique in the Iraq resolution, "the UN had an obligation to control
the definition of war goals, the means chosen to achieve them and to
use its authority to impose a ceasefire.""
The Iraq resolution said only that states acting under it should keep
the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions.56 Yemen, a
Security Council member at the time, objected that, "the Security Coun-
cil will have no control over those forces, which will fly their own
national flags. Furthermore, the command of those forces will have
nothing to do with the United Nations, although their actions will have
been authorized by the Security Council."57 Malaysia, another Security
51. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Move on Haiti May Be Weeks Away, N.Y. TIME, Aug. 1, 1994, at
A6.
52. Id. at A6 (quoting an unnamed senior military planner: "Wait and see what happens
in Rwanda .... If that situation settles down in the next couple of weeks, the focus could turn
back to Haiti.").
53. Weston, supra note 30, at 526-27 (saying that the lack of Security Council control
under the Iraq resolution was "not what the UN founders and Charter drafters had in mind.").
54. Mary E. O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 465 (1991) (stating, "[t]he
Charter calls for the U.N. itself, not a small group of members, to do the countering").
55. Richard Falk, Questioning the UN Mandate in the Gulf, IFDA DossIER, Apr.-June
1991, at 81, 82. See also Falk, supra note 39, at 625 (stating, "It]he mandate to wage war
[against Iraq] delegated almost unlimited discretion to the American-led coalition"); Weston,
supra note 30, at 518, 522 (criticizing the Iraq resolution for a lack of Security Council
control).
56. Iraq Resolution, supra note 1, at 2.
57. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 33 (Mr. Al-Ashtal, Yemen).
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Council member at the time of the Iraq resolution, understood that the
reporting requirement gave- the Security Council little role in directing
the military action. Its delegate said: "When the United Nations Security
Council provides the authorization for countries to use force, these
countries are fully accountable for their actions to the Council through a
clear system of reporting and accountability, which is not adequately
covered in resolution 678 (1990). "58
.On the Bosnia resolution, Zimbabwe and India abstained- because
the resolution did not provide for Security Council control over the
military action states might take.59 India said:
So long as it is the Security Council which i§ authorizing a particu-
lar course of action, it should be with due respect to Charter provi-
sions. It follows therefore, that, if use of force is to be authorized
under chapter VII, the provisions of that Chapter should be respect-
ed.
It is the view of my delegation that, in the present instance, it
would be highly advisable - indeed, imperative - that the opera-
tion, which could involve the use of force, should be and should
always remain under the command and control of the United Na-
tions. )'
Zimbabwe explained, in a similar vein, that it was
of the view that any necessary measures taken or arrangements
made to deal with this crisis have to be undertaken as a collective
enforcement measure under the full control of and with full ac-
countability to the United Nations through the Security Council, as
provided for by the Charter of the United Nations.
61
Zimbabwe was concerned about the possible consequences of an ab-
sence of Security Council control. It complained that the then draft
Bosnia resolution
seeks to authorize unidentified States, individually or collectively,
to take all measures necessary to facilitate the delivery of humani-
tarian assistance to Sarajevo and, wherever needed, in other parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, the draft resolution
seeks to empower any State which feels able and so inclined to use
58. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 76 (Mr. Abu Hassan, Malaysia).
59. Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Votes to Support Force in Assisting Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1992, at AI.
60. SCOR, 3106th mtg., supra note 3, at 12 (Mr. Gharekhan, India).
61. Id. at 16 (Mr. Mumbengegwi, Zimbabwe).
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military force in any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the name
of the United Nations but without any control from or accountabili-
ty to the United Nations. What is even more disturbing to my
delegation is the fact that it is left entirely to the individual States
so intervening to define the scope of the said humanitarian opera-
tion. My delegation has serious difficulties in accepting a proposi-
tion that calls upon the Security Council to authorize unidentified
States to use military force after which the Council is likely to
assume the role of helpless spectator in a military operation it has
so authorized.62
Zimbabwe was concerned in particular that if the action was taken by
individual states, rather than by the Security Council, these states might
be viewed as being partisan to one side or another. It spoke of
the danger that any individual State or indeed any group of States
undertaking a humanitarian mission backed by military force would
be seen by one or the other of the warring groups as having inter-
vened to support the political objectives of its opponents. Such a
perception would clearly intensify hostilities and lead to even more
suffering for the innocent civilians than is currently being experi-
enced.63
One danger in an absence of Security Council control is that the
states taking action may exceed the level of force the Security Council
authorized. The Iraq resolution, said Malaysia, anticipating this problem,
"does not provide a blank cheque for excessive and indiscriminate use
of force," 64 and cautioned "against any action purportedly taken under
this resolution that would lead to the virtual destruction of Iraq."65
In the later resolutions using the authorization technique, the Secur-
ity Council involved the Secretary-General in an attempt to provide
greater control. The Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti resolutions were adopt-
ed on the basis of a report and recommendation of the Secretary-
General; and the Secretary-General was to play a role in implementing
the resolution.6 This approach, though itself questionable for giving the
62. Id. at 16-17.
63. Id. at 17.
64. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 76-77 (Mr. Abu Hassan, Malaysia).
65. Id.
66. See Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992) (regard-
ing Somalia); Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994)
(regarding Rwanda); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/828 (1994) [hereinafter Report on Haiti] (regard-
ing Haiti).
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Secretary-General a role not directly contemplated by the Charter,
constituted an improvement over the earlier approach in terms of con-
trol.
The Somalia operation was the only one of this series of actions in
which the Security Council resolution gained a unanimous vote. The
reason for the unanimity was that the resolution included control mecha-
nisms.' 7 Zimbabwe, which had abstained on the Bosnia resolution, 6 said
that it supported the Somalia resolution because of its provisions aimed
at maintaining United Nations control. It said that the resolution placed
the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the controlling center of
the operation.69
The Secretary-General was to consult with the participating states
about their efforts70 and to arrange for "the unified command and con-
trol of the forces involved."7 ' An ad hoc commission of Security Coun-
cil members was to report back to the Council on what the participating
states were doing.72 Both the Secretary-General and the participating
states were to report to the Security Council "on a regular basis. 7
Despite the inclusion of these mechanisms, several members of the
Security Council supported the Somalia resolution only reluctantly. India
67. See, e.g., SCOR, 3145th mtg., supra note 5, at 32 (Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria, citing
the provisions regarding the Secretary-General's role in the use of all necessary
means and in making the necessary arrangements for the unified command and
control of the forces involved, and to the appointment of an ad hoc commission of
the Council, the creation of a liaison staff, and improved reporting requirements,
and expressing the view that the Council had in this respect "come a long way" since the Iraq
resolution); id. at 24 (Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium, stating,
the draft resolution makes it quite clear that the operation in Somalia will be under
the political control of the United Nations. The coordinating machinery to be set up
between the States participating in the operation and the Secretary-General, and the
decision-making powers granted to the Council concerning the duration of the
operation, are, in my delegation's opinion, key elements in this draft resolution.).
68. See Bosnia Resolution, supra note 3.
69. SCOR, 3145th mtg., supra note 5, at 7-10 (Mr. Mumbengegwi, Zimbabwe, stating
further,
Zimbabwe attaches a lot of importance' to the idea that in any international enforce-
ment action the United Nations must define the mandate; the United Nations must
monitor and supervise its implementation; and the United Nations must determine
when the mandate has been fulfilled. My delegation is happy that the draft resolu-
tion before us meets these very important requirements).
70. Somalia Resolution, supra note 5, at 3.
71. Id. at 4. This was done under the name UNITAF (Unified Task Force).
72. ILd.
73. Ild.
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told the Council: "The present actions should not, however, set a prece-
dent for the future. We would expect that, should situations arise in the
future requiring action under Chapter VII, it would be carried out in full
conformity with the Charter provisions . . '. . Belgium, another Coun-
cil member, expressed a similar preference: "Belgium would have
preferred this to be a purely United Nations operation .... China
said: "[Iln spite of the fact that the Secretary-General has been given
some authorization, the draft resolution has taken the form of authoriz-
ing certain countries to take military actions, which may adversely affect
the collective role of the United Nations. We hereby express our reser-
vations on this. 76
With the Rwanda operation, Nigeria expressed concern over a lack
of Security Council control. Nigeria thought that the insertion of new
forces should be carried out under the United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda (UNAMIR), already in place in Rwanda."
With the Haiti operation, China abstained, listing, among other
concerns, that "[t]he practice of the Council's authorizing certain Mem-
ber States to use force is even more disconcerting because this would
obviously create a dangerous precedent. 7 ' Pakistan, which, unlike
China, voted in favor of the Haiti resolution, said that a U.N.-led opera-
tion would have been a "preferred course of action. '79 New Zealand,
also voting in favor, expressed the same reservation: "New Zealand's
preference has always been and will always be for collective security to
be undertaken by the United Nations itself. That provides the assurance
that small countries seek from the United Nations when Chapter VII is
being invoked."80
The Secretary-General had told the Council that a U.N.-led opera-
tion in Haiti would be beyond the organization's financial capability.8 '
Noting the Secretary-General's point that use of the authorization tech-
nique would skirt this financial problem,82 New Zealand continued:
[Unless absolutely exceptional circumstances exist, the United
Nations itself should assume such responsibilities [for an opera-
74. SCOR, 3145th mtg., supra note 5, at 51 (Mr. Gharekhan, India).
75. lt at 24 (Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium).
76. Id. at 17 (Mr. Li Daoyu, China).
77. SCOR, 3392d mtg., supra note 7, at 10.
78. SCOR, 3413th mtg., supra note 10, at 12 (Mr. Li Zhaoxing, China).
79. Id. at 26 (Mr. Marker, Pakistan).
80. Id. at 21 (Mr. Keating, New Zealand).
81. Report on Haiti, supra note 66, at 6.
82. Id. at 6.
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tion]. In this regard, we have to record also that we do not agree
with the Secretary-General's conclusion that this was not feasible
in the case. of Haiti. The resource and management difficulties that
the United Nations faces are undeniable, but we believe they
should be seen as challenges to be overcome, not as excuses for
throwing in the towel and abrogating, the responsibilities for inter-
national-dispute settlement under United Nations auspices which
New Zealand and other Governments expect this Organization to
fulfil.83
The Council can, of course, at any time adopt a new resolution to
deal with a situation as it develops. However, this hands-off approach
allows the Council to control the action only if it finds major problems.
Moreover, such a new resolution would-need a qualified majority (of
eleven) required for all Security Council resolutions, including the con-
curring votes of all the permanent members.84 If, as typically would be
the case, one or more permanent members were participating in the
action, and if those permanent members thought the action was being
pursued appropriately, the Council would be unable to-adopt the new
resolution.
This possibility became reality with the implementation of the Iraq
resolution. After serious bombing of Iraq, peace efforts pursued by
various parties held the prospect that Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait
obviating the need for further military action. Faced with pressure to
desist, the United States and the United Kingdom reportedly threatened
to veto any proposed draft resolution that would have revoked the
authorization to use force against Iraq.8"
VII. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AS A BASIS
FOR THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE
When the authorization technique is used to counter an armed attack
by one state against another, an argument has been made that the autho-
rization technique is valid on the grounds that Article 42 is not implicat-
ed. In this situation, it is argued, use of the authorization technique can
be based on another article in Chapter VII, namely, Article 51. Appear-
ing as the final article in Chapter VII, Article 51 permits states to use
force in defense of other states that have been attacked, under a concept
called "collective self-defense," until the Security Council addresses the
83. Id. at 22.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 1 3.
85. Caron, supra note 39, at 577.
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matter.16 This argument can be made in cases like that of Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, although it has no relevance to situations of an internal
character, like that in Haiti.
As applied to cases of an external armed attack, the argument is tliat
the other state or states have a right to act under Article 51, and the
Security Council by "authorizing" them is doing nothing more than
acknowledging their already existing right to act. As one analyst put the
matter in connection with the Iraq situation, the Iraq resolution merely
"served the political purpose of underlining the general support of the
United Nations for the military measures" being taken by the states
already aiding Kuwait. 7
The difficulty with this approach is that Article 51 reads as an
exception to the powers granted to the Security Council in Chapter VII.
The purpose of Article 51 is to make it clear that until the Security
Council deals with a matter, a state subjected to armed attack may
defend itself - calling on other states, if necessary, for assistance. In
addition, Article 51 ensures this right of defense for the situation in
which the Security Council might not be able to act because of a veto
by a permanent member.88
There is no indication, however, in the text or history of Article 51,
that it was anticipated that the Security Council might refer to the rights
of other states as a method of acting itself. The obligation laid on the
Security Council in Article 39 is to deal with threats to the peace. It
would not seem that the Security Council can discharge this obligation
by allowing individual states to take action for the reasons already
indicated - the Council would have no control over either the initiation
of use of force or its subsequent course.
VIII. SELF-INTEREST OF THE STATES THAT TAKE ACTION
A major risk of the authorization technique is that states with their
own agendas may respond to the call to act. Typically, the Council has
used authorization where it already has an offer from a particular state.
Bosnia has been the only situation in which no state had indicated an
intent to act. Where a particular state is proposing the action and indi-
86. Although the term "collective self-defense" does not, strictly speaking, encompass
defense of one state by another, the term as used in Article 51 has generally been construed
to permit such. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 28, at-348. See Weston, supra note 30, at 520;
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1639
(1984).
87. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
460 (1991).
88. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 28, at 345.
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cates its intention to act on the Security Council's authorization, suspi-
cion arises about its self-interest.
The target state, in any event, no matter how egregious its conduct,
finds a ready argument against the propriety of the proposed action.
When the Security Council adopted the Iraq resolution, Iraq claimed the
United States proposed the resolution as a cover for its aggressive and
imperialist policies in the region. 9 The charge was all the more compel-
ling at the time because of the United States' predominance as the only
remaining superpower. Impugning the resolution and the reasons for its
adoption, Iraq said: "[T]he United States totally dominates the Security
Council and its arbitrary and biased procedures."' Shortly after the vote
on the Iraq resolution, the United States cut economic aid to Council
member Yemen, in apparent retaliation for Yemen's negative vote on
the resolution.9' This action reinforced the impression that the United
States was acting out of self-interest.92
In Rwanda, France had a history of involvement that cast doubt on
its good faith in taking military action. France had backed the Hutu-led
Rwandan government in its civil war against the Tutsi-led Rwanda
Patriotic Front.93 France was alleged to favor the Hutus because they
used French as their second language, while the Tutsis used English.9
France was criticized for failing to denounce major massacres of Tutsis
89. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 23 (Mr. AI-Anbari, Iraq). See also Falk, supra
note 39, at 626 (stating that there was "created the impression that the Security Council
lacked autonomy, and was appropriated by the United States to give a global community
'cover' to what was in essence a traditional exercise in great power diplomacy").
90. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 23 (Mr. AI-Anbari, Iraq).
91. Judith Miller, Kuwaiti Envoy Says Baker Vowed 'No Concessions' to Iraqis, N.Y.
TiMm, Dec. 5, 1990, at A22 (Kuwaiti ambassador to U.S. quoted as saying that Secretary
Baker told him U.S. would cut aid to Yemen because of its vote). See Rick Atkinson &
Barton Gellman, Iraq Trying to Shelter Jets in Iran, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1991, at
Al (State Department informed Congress it would cut aid to Yemen from a planned $22
million to under $3 million; State Department did not deny published report that after the vote
on the Iraq resolution a U.S. diplomat told Yemen Ambassador AI-Ashtal, "that will be the
most expensive vote you will have cast").
92. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United States Commitment to the Norms of the United
Nations and Its Related Agencies, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 141 (1991).
93. Philippe Leymarie, Tardif "Riveil Humanitaire": Litigieuse intervention frangaise au
Rwanda, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, July 1994, at 3 (questioning whether France was
entering Rwanda with humanitarian intent, given the fact that it had armed and trained the
government forces that were being accused of genocide against the civilian population of
Rwanda).
94. Bill Bowring, The "Droit et Devoir d'Ingerence": A 7imely New Remedy for
Africa?, 7 AFRICAN J. INT'L & COMp. L. 493, 506 (1995); Peter Smerdon, International
Community Failed Dismally in Rwanda, Reuters World Service, Sept. 29, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News library, Wires File.
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by Hutus. 95 French arms shipments to the Rwandan government con-
tinued as the massacres were underway.96
When the Rwanda resolution was adopted, the civil war still raged,
and the Tutsi rebel force announced its objection to France's planned
entry into Rwanda, vowing to attack French forces.97 Of all states in the
world, France was probably the worst choice for intervention, but it was
France that was willing to act.
The difficulty of achieving easy success with military interventions
has,' ironically, served to confirm suspicions about self-interest on the
part of intervening states. Among the major powers, the perceived
failure of Security Council-authorized interventions reinforced the belief
that a state should become involved militarily only if it has a direct
interest in the state in question. According to a Reuters' diplomatic
correspondent: "Analysts and diplomats say that problems with peace-
keeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia have made the most powerful
states - the United States, Russia, France and Britain - wary of
involvement in missions where they do not have a clear stake."98
As a result of such concerns, the United States in 1994 published a
statement on participation in United Nations peace operations that in-
cludes a requirement that the United States must have an interest in the
situation before it contributes troops. 9 If this statement is followed, the
United States, as a matter of formal policy, will intervene only if it has
a direct interest'- that is, An interest over and above that of preserving
the peace in the region in question. This policy is at odds with the U.N.
Charter concept that states are to contribute to international peace; the
Charter takes the approach that it is in the interest of all states that the
peace be preserved everywhere.
95. Id. (reporting criticism by the organization Africa Rights).
96. Id. (quoting a statement from a report by the organization Africa Rights alleging that
arms supplies acquired by the French Directorate for External Security arrived in Rwanda as
late as the end of May 1994).
97. Keith B. Richburg & Jonathan C. Randal, First French Soldiers Arrive on Mission to
Help Rwanda, WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at A29. See id. (Neighboring Burundi and
Tanzania denied France use of their territory as staging areas out of concern that France
would play a partisan role in Rwanda). See also SCOR, 3392d mtg., supra note 7, at 3 (Mr.
Sardenberg, Brazil, noting the Front's expressed opposition to the planned deployment). But
see Operation Turquoise: Two Months in Rwanda, Agence France Presse, Aug. 19, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News library, AFP File (indicating that as French troops were arriving
Rwanda Patriotic Front said it would not attack so long as the troops confined themselves to
humanitarian efforts).
98. Nicholas Doughty, Haiti Shows Big Power Shift on U.N. Missions, Reuters World
Service, Sept. 19, 1994, 1available in LEXIS, News library, Wires File.
99. Executive Summary: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral
Peace Operations, unclassified document, May 3, 1994. See also Tom Ashbrook, Who Will
Keep the Peace?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1995, at 1 (summarizing Executive Summary).
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If states intervene with Security Council backing in order to protect
their own narrow interests, the Charter enterprise is in serious danger.
Russia has been experiencing unrest on its periphery, in territories that
were formerly part of the Soviet Union. The perception that states
intervening under Security Council auspices were pursuing their own
interests prompted Russia to assert a primary role for itself in potential
interventions in conflicts in these territories.'re This action troubled
Western governments, as potentially leading to a sphere of influence for
Russia, but their own actions eisewhere left them in a weak position to
object."°
IX. THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE AS
AN ACT IN EXCESS OF POWER
The United Nations Charter is a treaty. If the authorization tech-
nique is beyond Charter-mandated powers for the Security Council, and
if on the basis of the authorization technique action is taken against a
member state, then that state's rights are violated. The Security Council,
to be sure, is a political body, but the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) has rejected the idea that the Council may lawfully act beyond
its Charter powers. In a case over whether the Security Council must
apply Charter criteria in deciding which new states to admit as members
of the United Nations, the Court said: "The political character of an
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions
established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers
or criteria for its judgment."' 2
This approach prevails in particular with respect to the Security
Council's powers concerning international peace. In another I.C.J. case,
two judges addressed the question of whether the Security Council must
abide by the Charter in exercising its power to determine whether a
threat to the peace is present. They said that the Council's exercise of
this power was subject to Charter limitations and to the Court's power
to determine whether the Council had complied with the Charter. 3
100. Doughty, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Conditions of Admission, supra note 36, at 64. But see id. (Alvarez, J., individual
opinion) (stating, "an institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of
the elements which have given birth to it, and it must.develop, not in accordance with the
views of those who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life").
.103. Legal Consequences for States of the Continuing Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 340 (Gros, J., dissenting) (stating, "[t]o assert that a matter may have
a distant repercussion on the maintenance of peace is not enough to turn the Security Council
into a world government."). Id. at 293 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting) (stating that the Security
Council's powers, under Article 24, are limited to those mentioned in the Charter's chapters
on Security Council powers).
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One analyst of the Charter, commenting on the Security Council's
expanded post-Cold War role in war-and-peace matters, notes that "the
Charter creates a governance of limited enumerated powers,"'104 and that
"[t]he United Nations is the creature of a treaty and, as such, it exercises
authority legitimately only in so far as it deploys powers which the
treaty parties have assigned to it."'0 5 Judge Bedjaoui of the I.C.J. has
said that the Security Council may not impose a decision on a member
state without observing the Charter. The United Nations, he writes,
"must be deemed an international institution that may not impose its
decisions in all domains on sovereign member states except in quite
limited and well defined cases and with a strict interpretation as relates
to maintenance of the peace."' 6
This proposition holds even if the action taken is in line with the
general purposes of the United Nations. Judge Winiarski of the I.C.J.
has written:
The fact that an organ of the United Nations is seeking to achieve
one of those purposes [as set out in Article 1 of the Charter] does
not suffice to render its action lawful. The Charter, a multilateral
treaty which was the result of prolonged and laborious negotia-
tions, carefully created organs and determined their competence
and means of action.1°7
The fact that some member states who sit on the Security Council
read the Charter to permit the authorization technique does not change
the fact that a violation has occurred. A treaty cannot lawfully be re-
interpreted by some of the parties to the detriment of another party.
08
As Judge Spender of the I.C.J. put the matter, the U.N. Charter
is a multilateral treaty. It cannot be altered at the will of the major-
ity of the Member States, no matter how often that will is ex-
pressed or asserted against a protesting minority and no matter how
large be the majority of Member States which assert its will in this
manner or how small the minority.' 9
104. Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council and "Threats to the Peace": Some
Remarks on Remarkable Recent Developments, in PEACE-KEEPING, supra note 14, at 83.
105. Id.
106. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Du contr~le de ligaliti des actes du Conseil de sicuriti, in
NOUVEAUX ITINRAIRES EN DROIT: HOMMAGE k FRANI;OIS RIGAUX 69, 109 (translation by
author).
107. Certain Expenses, supra note 18, at 230 (Winiarski, J., dissenting).
108. Id at 196 (Spender, J., separate opinion).
109. Id.
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To be sure, practice in applying a treaty subsequent to its entry into
force can be used to establish the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. " But where, as here, the practice involves only the states
that are members of the Security Council, the practice may not be
sufficiently general to manifest the agreement of the parties. Judge
Spender stated in this regard:
In practice, if the General Assembly (or any organ) exceeds its
authority there is little that the protesting minority may do except
to protest and reserve its rights whatever they may be. If, however,
the authority purported to be exercised against the objection of any
Member State is beyond power it remains so.'
Contrary to the prevailing view that the U.N. Charter created organs
of limited powers, it has been asserted that the Charter should be regard-
ed less as a treaty, and more like a constitution - namely, an instru-
ment to be construed more with regard to current needs and realities
than with the intent of the drafters. From a contextual standpoint, this
line of analysis makes considerable sense because the charter is the
constitution of an organization. However, international law as it has
developed does not treat a treaty establishing an organization substan-
tially different from any other treaty."l 2 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties makes no special provision for interpretation with
regard to such treaties. It must therefore be deemed the expectation of
the parties that the Charter be applied as written.
Ithas long been recognized that the Charter created an organization
that might not be able to act in one or another situation involving a
breach of peace. The most obvious instance is a case involving one of
the Security Council's permanent members, where that member's power
of veto could frustrate contemplated action against it."3 Judge Winiarski
said:
The intention of those who drafted [the U.N. Charter] was clearly
to abandon the possibility of useful action rather than to sacrifice
the balance of carefully established fields of competence, as can be
seen, for example, in the case of the voting in the Security Coun-
cil. It is only by such procedures, which were clearly defined, that
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 340.
111. Certain Expenses, supra note 18, at 196 (Spender, J., separate opinion).
112. See generally Edward Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitu-
tive Treaties, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 794 (1965).
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
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the United Nations can seek to achieve its purposes. It may be that
the United Nations is sometimes not in a position to undertake
action which would be useful for the maintenance of international
peace and security ... but that is the way in which the Organiza-
tion was conceived and brought into being.1
4
With the use of the authorization technique, the Charter is being amend-
ed in a de facto way. If the authorization technique were not available,
states would. be under greater pressure to agree to Security Council
collective enforcement.
X. THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE AS A
THREAT TO LEGITIMACY
As a result of exceeding its Charter powers, the Security Council
undermines any action that may be taken. This aspect of the authoriza-
tion technique was apparent in the case of Iraq, allowing Iraq to com-
plain that the action against it was illegal. Iraq specified the authoriza-
tion technique as unlawful. "Regrettably," it said, "the Council apparent-
ly thought that in this case the legal requirements were disposable nice-
ties."'.5
Where a state has violated international norms and the Council is
taking action against it, there is significant erosion of legitimacy when
the Council acts in a fashion that violates the Charter. Such an approach
gives the target state valid grounds for- objecting to the action taken
against it. Attention is deflected from that state's own Charter violation.
A target state in such a situation can, like Iraq, depict itself as a victim
of a cabal of states. Such an approach by a state like Iraq may garner
sympathy with other states and may help it to justify itself before its
own citizens.
Even beyond the reaction of a target state, the illegality of an action
of the Security Council may have undesirable effects. The legitimacy of
the actions of the Security Council rests, in the final analysis, on how
they are accepted by the world community. It has been noted in this
regard that
[a]s in a State where a constitution defines and legitimates the
exercise of political power, so, too, at the United Nations the
legitimacy of the exercise of power by the Security Council
114. Certain Expenses, supra note 18, at 230 (Winiarski, J., dissenting).
115. SCOR, 2963d mtg., supra note 1, at 21 (Mr. AI-Anbari, Iraq).
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depends upon the public perception that it is being exercised in
accordance with the Charter's applicable defining rules and stan-
dards. "
6
Judge Bedjaoui made this same point:
This new world order and the Security Council which is to be its
only worldly arm can gain credibility, authority, and effectiveness,
only if there is a belief that they act not as institutions above the
Charter and above international law, but as servants of the Charter
and of international law."
7
A number of states have persistently objected to use of the authori-
zation technique, as reflected in critical comments made before the
Council." 8 Yemen's ambassador, who represented Yemen during the
Security Council debate on Iraq, said of the Iraq resolution, "it's'just a
blanket authorization, and is one of the most dangerous resolutions that
the UN Security Council has adopted in its history."" 9 As the Haiti
resolution was adopted, Mexico objected that "a kind of carte blanche
has been awarded to an undefined multinational force to act when it
deems it to be appropriate. This seems to us an extremely dangerous
practice in the field of international relations.' 2
If the Council exceeds its powers, it risks the loss of legitimacy. If
the Council loses legitimacy, then not onlywill target states have good
grounds to object to the actions taken. against them, but governments
may be reluctant to contribute troops to implement Council resolutions,
and military personnel in units contributed by member states may be
reluctant to risk their lives by participating.
XI. A TEST OF THE LEGALITY OF
THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE
A restrictive view of the authorization technique may prevent the
Security Council from acting in some situations. At the same time,
however, it may keep the Council from acting in situations in which
action is not warranted. One critic of the authorization technique ac-
knowledged the obvious retort that he was placing too tight an interpre-
tation on the Security Council's power, but he deemed the restriction
116. Franck, supra note 104, at 85.
117. Bedjaoui, supra note 106, at 76 (translation by author).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 57-65.
119. "Eventually There Can Only Be an Arab Solution", MIDDLE EAST REP., Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 8, 9 (interview with Ambassador Abdallah AI-Ashtal).
120. SCOR, 3413th mtg., supra note 10, at 5 (Mr. Flores Olen, Mexico).
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necessary to prevent actions whose purposes might not be clearly set by
the Council: "Some will criticize the reasons we have just developed as
too systematic and restrictive. But we believe that this precise and
systematic approach is in reality necessary in order to prevent, or at
least to try to prevent, unlimited use of poorly defined powers.''
The Charter provides a route whereby the legality of the authoriza-
tion technique can be tested. The Charter gives the I.C.J. the power to
issue advisory opinions at the request of the Security Council or General
Assembly.122 Either body could ask the Court for an advisory opinion on
the authorization technique. This would allow the technique to be as-
sessed outside the context of a crisis situation and by the body most
qualified to determine the meaning of the Charter. Although an advisory
opinion would not be binding, it would carry considerable moral weight.
The Council is unlikely to request such an advisory opinion, for it
would gain little. It would risk having a cloud cast over a technique it
finds useful. The General Assembly has less to lose by requesting such
an opinion.
A restrictive view may also make manifest the need for action of the
kind contemplated by the Charter. It could place pressure on states to
act in the way Article 42 requires. Another possible solution would be
to amend Chapter VII to permit authorization by the Security Council.
Amendment is a difficult and time-consuming process, so much so that
it may not be practicable. Indeed, it is because of the difficulty of
amendment that the Security Council has resorted to practices that it
deemed appropriate but which were questionable under the Charter.
Such an amendment, even if politically feasible, would not be wise.
For the reasons indicated in this article, the Council is better advised to
take action under Chapter VII only when it can direct the action itself.
Unleashing individual states, even with Secretary-General involvement,
is too risky an approach when one is considering sending a military
force into a state.
XII. RESULTS OF USE OF THE AUTHORIZATION TECHNIQUE
The Security Council has enjoyed mixed success in its "authoriza-
tion" interventions, but the experience points to the hazards involved.'
23
With Iraq, success was achieved in gaining Iraq's withdrawal from
121. Bothe, supra note 14, at 74.
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
123. See Falk, supra note 39, at 627 ("Subsequent developments in Somalia, Bosnia,
Haiti, and Rwanda have confirmed the need for a more autonomous mechanism for collective
security .... ).
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Kuwait, but there was controversy over the manner in which this was
accomplished. The United States directed military force not only against
Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait; it also bombed central Iraq on the
theory of destroying the infrastructure that allowed Iraq to fight. 24 A
U.N. inspection team called this bombing "near apocalyptic" and said it
reduced life in Iraq to a "pre-industrial stage."'' 25 The Secretary-General
called it "disturbing" that "civilian casualties [in Iraq] are mounting and
that damage to residential areas throughout Iraq has been widespread.'
' 26
During the. hostilities directed against Iraq, the Secretary-General
bemoaned the paucity of information the U.N. received from the partici-
pating states. "What we know about the war," he said, is
what we hear from the three members of the Security Council
which are involved - Britain, France and the United States -
which every two or three days report to the Council, after the
actions have taken place. The Council, which has authorised all
this, is informed only after the military actions have taken place.
As I am not a military expert I cannot evaluate how necessary are
the military actions taking place now.1
27
When the states acting under the resolution began land operations
against Iraqi forces, the "Soviet foreign ministry expressed 'regret that a
realistic chance for a peaceful outcome to the conflict and for the attain-
ment of the aims stipulated in the UN Security Council resolutions,
without further human casualties and material destruction, has been
missed.' ,,I28 By this time, Iraq had agreed to withdraw from Kuwait, but
124. See Fred Kaplan, General Credits Air Force with Iraqi Army's Defeat, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1991, at Al.
125. Excerpts from U.N. Report on Need for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at A5. See also Paul Lewis, UN Survey Calls Iraq's War Damage
Near-Apocalyptic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at Al (noting that the team found that the
bombing affected major economic sites, such as sewage and water treatment facilities, and
electrical generating plants); Increased Activity in Northern Iraq, 184 ICRC BULLETIN I
(May 1991) (I.C.R.C. (Int'l Committee of the Red Cross) repairs on Baghdad water supply
had restored system to 20% of former capacity by mid-April 1991). Physicians who inspected
Iraq reported that all seven of Baghdad's water purification plants were non-functional, and
that vibrations and shock waves from bombs cracked water and sewer mains throughout the
city. As a result of the destruction of the electrical generating capacity of Baghdad, water
could not be pumped through the distribution system. The Physicians for Human Rights found
that the lack of electricity and water led to infantile diarrhea and other disease from untreated
sewage and the drinking of unsanitary water. Health Crisis in Baghdad, 4 PHR RECORD I
(Spring 1991).
126. Nikolai Maslov, UN Chief Informs Security Council on Gulf Situation, TAss, Feb. 9,
1991, available in LEXIS, News library, Tass File.
127. Leonard Doyle, UN 'Has No Role in Running War', INDEPENDENT (London), Feb.
11, 1991, at 2 (interview with P6rez de Cuellar).
128. Countdown to Iraq's Defeat, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Mar. 8, 1991, at 7.
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not as rapidly as the states acting under the resolution thought appropri-
ate. Thus, there was a serious issue as to whether the land operations
conducted against Iraq were necessary. Had the Security Council been in
control, these operations might have been avoided.
Under the Bosnia resolution, France, the U.K., Canada, and Spain
sent several thousand troops in a grouping called United Nations Protec-
tion Force II (UNPROFOR II) to ensure the delivery of supplies, 29 but
these troops enjoyed only limited success because of military opposition
from Bosnian Serb militias." ° In 1993, the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked the two Bosnia resolutions as a
basis for air strikes around Sarajevo against Bosnian Serb emplacements,
arguing that this invocation was appropriate because the air strikes were
aimed at securing the delivery of shipments of food, fuel, and medi-
cine. 131 The Secretary-General agreed that reliance on the Bosnia resolu-
tions was proper, 32 but Russia objected that the air strikes were outside
the authorization found in the Bosnia resolutions. 33 The Russian opposi-
tion was apparently based on the premise that the air strikes were aimed
less at securing the delivery of humanitarian aid than at opening an arms
supply route to Sarajevo for the Bosnian government.' 34
The invocation of the Bosnia resolution demonstrates the hazard of
having a resolution in force over an extended period of time, so that it is
invoked under factual circumstances differing from those in effect at the
time the resolution was adopted. Reliance on a resolution in such cir-
cumstances is likely to be contested, as was done by Russia in the
Bosnia case.
129. So numbered to distinguish it from UNPROFOR, the United Nations humanitarian
assistance operation established by S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg. at
1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
130. James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 27, 44 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT].
131. Peter Pringle, Bosnia: US and UN Vie For Control of Air Strikes, INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 5, 1993, at 8; Christopher Dismisses Unilateral U.S. Action in Bosnia,
Agence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File (quoting
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher).
132. Bosnia: Boutros-Ghali Says U.N. Role in Air Strikes Vital, Inter Press Service, Apr.
30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Wires File (quoting Secretary-General's inter-
view on Public Broadcasting Service).
133. Russia Opposes Use of Force in Bosnia Without UN Security Council Authorization,
BBC World Service, Aug. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
134. See Branislav Andjelich, In Bosnia, Air Strikes Alone Won't Do the Job; No Break
in Arms Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at A18 (Letter to the Editor) (suggested theory
that the recent Bosnian Serb capture of Mount Igman, near Sarajevo, had cut off an arms
supply route theretofor used by Bosnian government for getting arms into Sarajevo).
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In Somalia, the forces of the member states succeeded in distribut-
ing humanitarian aid but failed to bring political stability. 135 The United
States quickly came into conflict with the Secretary-General; the United
States was seeking a short stay with a subsequent takeover by U.N.
troops. 136 In addition, the United States determined there was a need to
defeat the forces loyal to Mohamed Farah Aidid. 137 Other states in-
volved, notably Italy, viewed, the United States' approach as inappropri-
ate and specifically criticized a helicopter assault by the United States
on an Aidid command center in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital city, that
resulted in fifty civilian deaths. Italy called on the United Nations com-
mand to suspend combat operations in Mogadishu. 138 In response, the
U.N. command asked Italy to replace the commander of Italy's contin-
gent, but Italy refused, insisting, correctly, that it had the right to ap-
point the head of its contingent. 39 The open dissension in the ranks of
the member states led to an early withdrawal of forces.
In Rwanda, within days after the French arrival, the Tutsi-led rebels
consolidated their victory and took control of Rwanda. As a result of the
rebel victory, the situation that France found in Rwanda differed from
that existing at the time of the Security Council resolution. Those on the
side of the overthrown government, rather than those on the rebel side,
became the ones at risk. In addition, there arose a danger of reprisal
against Hutus for actual or suspected involvement in the massacres that
had occurred during the civil war.14° France established a "safe zone" in
southwest Rwanda, 4' and it was predominantly Hutus who sought
refuge there. 142 As a result of being authorized by the Security Council
135. Somalia Resolution, supra note 5 (preamble indicates that Security Council was
"determined" to facilitate a political settlement in Somalia, although no operative paragraph
suggested that this should be accomplished). See generally Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia:
Failure of the Collective Response in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 130, at 205.
136. See, e.g., U.S. Forces to Hand Over Somalia Duty, Christopher Says, Associated
Press, Feb. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws File (discussing tension
between U.S. and Secretary-General over a transition to U.N. force).
137. Michael R. Gordon, Europeans Plan Early Pullout From Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1993, at AI0. See also U.N. Urges U.S. Not to Abandon Its Peace Keeping Role, National
Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, NPR File' (inter-
view with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali detailing his differences with U.S. government).
138. Italy's Somalia Commander 'Will Stay', Press Association Newsfile, July 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News library, Wires File.
139. Id.
140. Robert M: Press, Rwanda: A Future Without War?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
29, 1994, at 6 (indicating that new Tutsi-led government was concerned that Tutsis would
take revenge on Hutus).
141. Operation Turquoise: Two Months in Rwanda, supra note 97.
142. Warning on Rwanda Refugees, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 2 (estimating that 1.6
million Hutus took refuge in safe zone).
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to act on its own, France alone decided how to accommodate to the new
situation it found in Rwanda. Had the operation been under Security
Council control, the Council would have made that determination. While
the Council might well have made the same decision made by France,
the changed circumstance nevertheless illustrates a hazard of the authori-
zation technique.
In Haiti, the operation was conducted almost totally by the United
States, just as in Rwanda it was almost totally conducted by France. The
Haiti operation achieved the removal of the military group from office
and the resumption of power by the elected president, and this with no
actual military hostilities. 43 Thus, the Security Council achieved its
main objective.
The generally negative experience with peace enforcement under-
taken by authorization has, ironically, led not to a disinclination to use
this technique, but rather has contributed to an attitude among Security
Council members that authorization, rather than Security Council-led
actions, is the better course for the future. According to one observer:
"The United Nations has clearly been troubled by bad experiences in
Bosnia and Somalia .... What we're seeing is that it will increasingly
farm out missions to countries willing to act. The idea of a global will
to deal with crises is not there."' 144 If this view is accurate, the Security
Council's use of the authorization technique is the model for the future,
and the prospects for proper Security Council actions are slim.
45
CONCLUSION
It has often been said that there is nothing wrong with the United
Nations but with its member states. This may be the problem reflected
in the Security Council's adoption of the authorization technique. Mem-
ber states, and particularly the major powers, have not been willing to
subordinate their actions to the organization and have insisted on retain-
ing the free hand that the authorization technique affords. These states
have, in effect, blackmailed the United Nations into accepting authoriza-
tion. Their implicit message to the organization has been that it either
accept authorization or stand by idly in the face of threats to the peace.
If the Security Council succumbs to such blackmail, perhaps the fault
lies less with the Council itself than with the states that pressure it.
143. Carter Deal Saves Haiti from Invasion, TIMES (London), Sept. 19, 1994, at 1.
144. Doughty, supra note 98 (quoting Trevor Findlay, expert on the United Nations at
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).
145. Another serious contributing factor is finances, since with authorized actions the
states themselves pay the bills. Id.
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Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who has been at the center of
several of the operations based on a Security Council authorization,
finds it a less than optimal approach:
[N]either the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present
has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations
for [enforcement action], except perhaps on a very limited scale. I
believe that it is desirable in the long term that the United Nations
develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to attempt to do so
at the present time when the Organization is resource starved and
hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peace-
keeping responsibilities entrusted to it.'
4 6
Ironically, it was the end of the Cold War that has allowed the
Security Council to play so freely with the Charter. During the Cold
War, one superpower or the other would veto a resolution that gave
such a free hand for military action under United Nations auspices.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the restraints imposed by the
superpower confrontation have dissipated. The Western powers, enjoy-
ing predominance in the Security Council, are in a position to secure the
adoption of resolutions giving themselves a free hand to use military
force.
If the Security Council is to maintain its integrity as an institution,
its members must work to reassert Council prerogatives. Unless this is
done, there will be little viability in the concept of collective enforce-
ment of the peace.
146. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position paper of Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 50th
Sess., para. 77, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 (1995).
